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HOLDINGS: [1]-In their action objecting to the valuation of an acquired company's shares for 
purposes of appraisal, petitioners' Del. Ch. Ct. R. 59 motion for reargument was improper, as 
they had not shown that the court, informed by the state supreme court's decisions in Dell, Inc. v. 
Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., and DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value P'rs, 
L.P., misapprehended the facts or the applicable law; for petitioners to dispute using a 30-day 
average to determine the unaffected market price rather than some other measurement period 
constituted a new argument beyond the scope of Rule 59(f), and the state supreme court's 
endorsement of the efficient capital markets hypothesis in Dell and DFC suggested a greater (yet 
still non-mandatory) role for the use of market price when determining fair value. 
 
 
Outcome 
Motion denied. 
 
 
 
LexisNexis® Headnotes 
 
 
 
Civil Procedure > Judgments > Relief From Judgments > Motions to Reargue 
HN1   Relief From Judgments, Motions to Reargue 
The movants for reargument bear the burden of demonstrating that the court overlooked a 
decision or principle of law that would have controlling effect or misapprehended the law or the 
facts so that the outcome of the decision would be affected. A party moving for reargument is not 
permitted to raise new arguments that they failed to present in a timely way. An argument that 
was not previously raised is therefore waived, and the motion must be denied for that reason 
alone. Del. Ch. Ct. R. 59 is also not a vehicle to rehash or more forcefully present arguments 
already made. The court will deny a motion for reargument that does no more than restate a 
party's prior arguments. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN2   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
The Delaware Supreme Court has endorsed a traditional version of the semi-strong form of the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis, not the strong form. Under the semi-strong version, 
information concerning a company is quickly impounded into the company's stock price such 
that the price reflects the information. The semi-strong form of the hypothesis differs from the 
strong form, in which stock prices reflect all information relevant to value, both public and 
nonpublic. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
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Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN3   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
For purposes of stock appraisals, the Delaware Supreme Court has stressed that the trial courts 
must take into account accepted financial and economic principles. This mandate applies to the 
trial court's factual findings. It extends to the trial court's choice of valuation methodologies. And 
it encompasses the final determination of fair value. As the Delaware Supreme Court has 
emphasized, the efficient capital markets hypothesis is a widely accepted principle in corporate 
finance. It follows that a trial court would be obligated to consider the valuation implications of a 
stock price generated by a market having attributes consistent with the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN4   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
For purposes of stock appraisals, reliance on market value is a technique that is generally 
considered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissible in court. More like 
this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN5   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
For purposes of stock appraisals, a trial court can rely on a single valuation methodology. 
More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN6   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
For purposes of stock appraisals, if the Court of Chancery of Delaware relies on multiple 
valuation methods, it must exercise its considerable discretion while also explaining, with 
reference to the economic facts before it and corporate finance principles, why it is according a 
certain weight to a certain indicator of value. The Supreme Court of Delaware has admonished 
that in some cases, it may be that a single valuation metric is the most reliable evidence of fair 
value and that giving weight to another factor will do nothing but distort that best estimate. 
More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
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HN7   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
For purposes of stock appraisals, while the unaffected market price need not equate to 
fundamental value, it nevertheless generates a measure of value that is more likely to be accurate 
than other methodologies. The efficient market hypothesis long endorsed by the Supreme Court 
of Delaware teaches that the price produced by an efficient market is generally a more reliable 
assessment of fair value than the view of a single analyst. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN8   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
For purposes of stock appraisals, when none of the parties establishes a value that is persuasive, 
the Court must make a determination based upon its own analysis. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
Constitutional Law > The Judiciary 
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation 
HN9   Constitutional Law, The Judiciary 
The Constitution invests the Judiciary, not the Legislature, with the final power to construe the 
law. The interpretation of statutory text is one of the Judiciary's characteristic roles. The 
Delaware courts play a particularly significant role in the corporate arena, where historically the 
judiciary, rather than the General Assembly, has taken the lead. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 
LASTER, V.C. 
5 
 
In May 2015, Hewlett-Packard Company ("HP") acquired Aruba Networks, Inc. ("Aruba" or the 
"Company"). Under the merger agreement, each share of Aruba common stock was converted 
into the right to receive consideration of $24.67 per share, subject to the holder's statutory right 
to eschew the merger consideration and seek appraisal.1  The petitioners perfected their 
appraisal rights and litigated this statutory appraisal proceeding. 
In a post-trial memorandum opinion dated February 15, 2018, I determined that the fair value of 
Aruba for purposes of appraisal was $17.13 per share.2  In reaching this conclusion, I relied 
heavily on the Delaware Supreme Court's recent decisions in Dell3  and DFC.4  As I read 
them, those decisions endorsed using the market [*2]  price of a widely traded firm as an 
indicator of fair value if the market for the shares of the firm exhibited attributes associated with 
the premises underlying the efficient capital markets hypothesis.5  As I read them, those 
decisions also endorsed using the deal price in a third-party, arm's-length transaction as an 
indicator of fair value, after deducting synergies from the deal price.6  As I read them, those 
decisions also cautioned against relying on discounted cash flow analyses prepared by 
adversarial experts when reliable market indicators are available.7  
Informed by my readings of Dell and DFC, the Post-Trial Ruling declined to give any weight to 
the expert valuations, which relied on discounted cash flow analyses to reach divergent results.8
 The market for Aruba's common stock exhibited attributes consistent with the premises of the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis,9  so I considered Aruba's thirty-day average unaffected 
market price of $17.13 per share to be a reliable indicator of value.10  I also considered the deal 
price to be a reliable indicator of value, but concluded that Dell, DFC, and the appraisal statute 
required adjustments to exclude "any element of [*3]  value arising from the accomplishment or 
expectation of the merger."11  Based on a study cited by the respondent's expert and synergy 
estimates in the record from Aruba and HP, I derived a midpoint valuation indication based on 
the deal-price-minus-synergies of $18.20 per share.12  
I then confronted the challenge of how to harmonize, weigh, or otherwise decide between two 
probative yet divergent indications of fair value. Although my deal-price-minus-synergies 
indicator represented my best effort under the circumstances, it potentially suffered from a 
variety of measurement errors, raising concerns about its reliability.13  I also concluded, based 
on the work of leading scholars, that my deal-price-less-synergies figure continued to incorporate 
an element of value derived from the merger itself: the value that the acquirer creates by 
reducing agency costs through the aggregation of a control position (here 100% ownership).14  
Under the appraisal statute, the petitioners should not be entitled to share in that element of 
value, because it "aris[es] from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger."15  My 
synergy deduction compensated for the one element of value arising from the merger, [*4]  but 
addressing this other aspect would require a further downward adjustment.16  By contrast, the 
market value indicator did not require adjustments. Under a traditional formulation of the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis, the unaffected market price provides a direct indication of 
the value of the subject company based on its operative reality independent of the merger, at 
least for a company that is widely traded and lacks a controlling stockholder.17  I therefore 
concluded on the facts presented that the most persuasive evidence of Aruba's fair value was its 
unaffected trading price of $17.13 per share.18  
Under Court of Chancery Rule 59(f), "[a] motion for reargument setting forth briefly and 
distinctly the grounds therefor may be served and filed within 5 days [*5]  after the filing of the 
Court's opinion or the receipt of the Court's decision."19  The petitioners have moved for 
reargument.20  
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HN1  As movants, the petitioners bear the burden of demonstrating that I "overlooked a 
decision or principle of law that would have controlling effect" or "misapprehended the law or 
the facts so that the outcome of the decision would be affected."21  A party moving for 
reargument is not permitted "to raise new arguments that they failed to present in a timely 
way."22  An argument that was not previously raised "is therefore waived, and the motion must 
be denied for that reason alone."23  Rule 59 is also "not a vehicle to rehash or more forcefully 
present arguments already made."24  "[T]he Court will deny a motion for reargument that does 
no more than restate a party's prior arguments."25  
The Reargument Motion advances what appear to be eight grounds for reargument. In the order 
presented, they are: 
• I misapprehended the law due to my "frustration with many of the Supreme Court's 
pronouncements."26  
• I misapprehended both the law and the facts by reaching "an absurd result that no 
litigant [*6]  would even ask for."27  
• I misapprehended the import of the discussion of the efficient capital markets hypothesis in 
Dell and DFC, because "the superior tribunal simply referred to the ECMH to criticize the Court 
of Chancery's reliance on information that the Supreme Court deemed was known to the market 
as a reason for not giving substantial weight to the deal price."28  
• I misapprehended the facts when applying the efficient capital markets hypothesis because the 
trial record established that there was information about the value of Aruba that had not been 
incorporated into the unaffected market price.29  
• I misapprehended the law because relying on the unaffected trading price as an indicator of 
value is "ridiculous."30  
• I acted "arbitrarily and capriciously" by using a 30-day average to measure the unaffected 
market price rather than some other period.31  
• I misapprehended the law and the facts because "the measuring point for the valuation is 
supposed to be the closing date (May 18, 2015), but the Court effectively used the 30 day period 
between January 26, 2015 and February 24, 2015 as the 'valuation date.'"32  
• I violated my "oath to Delaware to uphold the Delaware Constitution"33  by using 
the [*7]  unaffected market price as an indicator of fair value because this means, as a practical 
matter, "that there can never be an appraisal for a public company receiving a premium offer, 
regardless of the size of that premium."34  This approach "eliminated the statutory right to 
appraisal provided by the General Assembly in the context of a publicly traded company."35  
In this decision, I take the liberty of grouping conceptually similar objections together, rather 
than following the order in which the petitioners presented them. 
This decision denies the Reargument Motion. The petitioners have not shown that I 
misapprehended the facts or the applicable law. When preparing the Post-Trial Ruling, I 
reasoned through the issues as best I could and reached what I believe is the correct 
determination of fair value for purposes of this case. At this point, the proper institutional 
remedy for correcting any errors lies with the senior tribunal on appeal. 
 
 
A. Objections To The Application Of The Legal Framework 
Three of the petitioners' objections accept for the sake of argument that the Post-Trial Ruling 
could rely on the unaffected market price as a valuation indicator, but they [*8]  assert that I 
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misapprehended the law and the facts when doing so. These are the petitioners' most 
straightforward contentions, so this decision starts with them. 
 
 
1. The Use Of A Thirty-Day Average 
The petitioners contend that I acted "arbitrarily and capriciously" by using a 30-day average to 
determine the unaffected market price rather than some other measurement period.36  The 
petitioners claim that "[t]here is no record evidence or citation to support that choice."37  They 
ask rhetorically, "Does an efficient market really take 30 days to adjust to provide evidence of 
fair value . . . ? Why isn't it 90 days? Why isn't it 1 day?"38  They note that the period chosen 
makes a substantial difference in the outcome: 
[H]ad the Court selected 1 day, the fair value would have been $18.38; had it selected 90 days, it 
would have been $18.81; had it selected 120 days, it would have been $19.51; had it selected the 
opening price the day HP first approached Aruba about a deal, it would have been $22.01.39  
The petitioners' objection to the 30-day measurement period represents a new argument that is 
not cognizable under Rule 59(f). 
During post-trial briefing and at post-trial argument, the respondent consistently [*9]  argued for 
using Aruba's 30-day average trading price, measured before the news of a potential deal leaked, 
as the relevant metric for the unaffected market price.40  The respondent did not bury the lede: 
Aruba identified this metric in the opening lines of every one of its post-trial briefs, and its 
counsel mentioned it at the outset of his argument during the post-trial hearing.41  
The petitioners never contested the 30-day metric, nor did they offer a different one. They took 
the broader position that Aruba's market price was depressed and unreliable. The petitioners 
could have engaged on the proper measurement period for market value by noting that they 
believed that the market price was unreliable, but that if the court disagreed and chose to 
consider that metric, then the court should use a different measurement period. Parties often 
make alternative arguments of this type. Rather than engaging in this manner, the petitioners did 
not advocate in favor of any metric for market value. Even now, the Reargument Motion does 
not argue that the court should have used a particular measurement period. The Reargument 
Motion simply [*10]  observes that different measurement periods could produce different 
valuation indications. 
Had the petitioners engaged on the measurement period, then the respondent doubtless would 
have provided support for the 30-day metric. In response to the Reargument Motion, the 
respondent has cited authorities indicating that using a 30-day period is both "generally 
considered acceptable in the financial community"42  and within a court's discretionary 
judgment.43  I would have considered the parties' competing arguments, and perhaps there 
would have been good reason to choose a different period. But the petitioners did not engage on 
how long the measurement period should be. They chose to reject market value entirely. For the 
petitioners to dispute the proper measurement period now constitutes a new argument that is 
beyond the scope of Rule 59(f). 
The petitioners also point out that I did not provide a footnoted record citation for the source of 
the 30-day average. This argument presents a somewhat different point than their objection to the 
30-day average because the petitioners could not have raised this omission [*11]  before seeing 
the Post-Trial Ruling. 
Because the 30-day measurement period permeated the briefing, it did not occur to me to provide 
a footnoted record citation to support it. It appeared uncontested that if I adopted market value as 
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a metric, then the 30-day average was an appropriate measurement period and $17.13 per share 
was the relevant figure. The Post-Trial Ruling spanned 129 pages and was encumbered by 498 
footnotes. In my view, the omission of a 499th footnote does not rise to a misapprehension of 
fact sufficient to warrant reargument. 
 
 
2. The Gap Between The Market Indication And The Valuation Date 
The petitioners next contend that I misapprehended the law because "the measuring point for the 
valuation is supposed to be the closing date (May 18, 2015), but the Court effectively used the 30 
day period between January 26, 2015 and February 24, 2015 as the 'valuation date.'"44  I did not 
misapprehend the law regarding the valuation date or miss the fact that using earlier market 
measures resulted in a temporal gap between the evidence of value and the valuation date. The 
Post-Trial Ruling considered the issue explicitly,45  just as I have done in other appraisal 
decisions.46  
The Post-Trial Ruling found that "neither side proved that Aruba's value had changed materially 
by closing, so this decision sticks with the unaffected market price and the deal price less 
synergies."47  As support for the legitimacy of this determination, the Post-Trial Ruling cited 
Chief Justice Strine's decision in the Union Illinois case, issued while he served on this court, in 
which he reached a similar conclusion regarding the insignificance of the temporal gap based on 
the record presented in that matter.48  
The petitioners have not shown that I misapprehended the law or facts as to the temporal gap. 
They simply disagree with the finding made in the Post-Trial Ruling. That disagreement gives 
rise to an issue for appeal, not grounds for reargument.49  
 
 
3. The Existence Of Information That Was Not Known To The Market 
The petitioners also contend that I misapprehended the facts when applying the efficient capital 
markets hypothesis as framed in Dell and DFC because the trial record established that there was 
information about the value of Aruba that was undisclosed and could not have been incorporated 
into the unaffected market price.50  The petitioners contend [*13]  that by using the 30-day 
unaffected market price, the Post-Trial Ruling effectively adopted the strong form of market 
efficiency rather than the semi-strong form that the Dell and DFC decisions endorsed.51  
I agree that HN2  the Delaware Supreme Court's decisions in Dell and DFC endorsed a 
traditional version of the semi-strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, not the 
strong form.52  Under the semi-strong version, information concerning a company is quickly 
impounded into the company's stock price such that the price reflects the information. The semi-
strong form of the hypothesis differs from the strong form, in which stock prices reflect all 
information relevant to value, both public and nonpublic.53  
The petitioners now argue that I found that there was information that was not impounded into 
the trading price. In the Post-Trial Ruling, I made the following findings about Aruba's release of 
information to the market: 
At the end of January 2015, HP offered to acquire Aruba for $23.25 per share. During the first 
week of February, while Aruba was considering its response, another [*14]  analyst report 
criticized the Company, and the stock price fell again, closing around $16.07 the day after the 
report. Contrary to the market's perception, Aruba management knew internally that Aruba was 
having an excellent quarter and would beat its guidance. But, rather than correcting the market's 
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perception, Aruba management proposed to time the announcement of the merger to coincide 
with the announcement of Aruba's February 2015 earnings. Companies often announce 
significant items as part of an earnings release, particularly if the earnings are bad and the news 
is good (or vice versa). In this case, Aruba management believed that an increase in the stock 
price would hurt their chances of getting the deal approved. Providing both pieces of information 
simultaneously would blur the market's reaction to Aruba's strong quarterly results and help get 
the deal approved.54  
I noted that after Aruba announced its strong quarterly results in conjunction with the merger, 
"Aruba's stock traded briefly above the deal price, indicating the market took into account both 
the announcement of the deal and Aruba's strong results."55  
As with the measurement period, the petitioners could have used the 
conjunctive [*15]  announcement as an opportunity to engage with the respondent's proffered 
measure of the unaffected market price and argue for a higher figure. Had they done so, then in 
my view the respondent would have had a strong argument that to the extent the market price 
reacted to news of the deal, the resulting valuation impact represented an "element of value 
arising from the . . . expectation of the merger."56  That argument would have forced the 
petitioners to try to disentangle the effect of the earnings information from the effect of the 
merger announcement.57  
The petitioners did not make the attempt. Instead, they argued broadly that the market price was 
unreliable and should be disregarded because investors were undervaluing Aruba. The Post-Trial 
Ruling considered that argument and rejected it.58  
For the petitioners now to argue that I should have constructed and considered a different market 
price constitutes a new argument. It does not provide a basis for relief under Rule 59(f). 
 
 
B. Objections To The Interpretation Of Dell And DFC That Created The Legal Framework 
The petitioners' next three objections disagree with the Post-Trial Ruling's reliance on Aruba's 
unaffected market price as a valuation [*16]  indicator. They contend that the Post-Trial Ruling 
misapprehended the import of the Delaware Supreme Court's rulings in Dell and DFC and 
should not have considered the unaffected market price. This is logically the next set of 
arguments to tackle. 
 
 
1. Whether Dell And DFC Meant To Endorse The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis As A 
Valuation Tool 
The petitioners argue that the Post-Trial Ruling misapprehended the import of the discussion of 
the efficient capital markets hypothesis in Dell and DFC, because neither decision "required the 
Court of Chancery to weight the supposedly 'unaffected' market trading price at all."59  Rather, 
the petitioners say that "the superior tribunal simply referred to the ECMH to criticize the Court 
of Chancery's reliance on information that the Supreme Court deemed was known to the market 
as a reason for not giving substantial weight to the deal price."60  
I agree that Dell and DFC did not require the Court of Chancery to give weight to the unaffected 
market price. The Post-Trial Ruling did not proceed on the premise that I was required to give 
weight to the unaffected market price, nor did I ultimately give exclusive weight to the 
unaffected market price because [*17]  I thought I was required to do so. 
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Instead, I perceived that Dell and DFC endorsed the reliability of the unaffected market price as 
an indicator of value, at least for a widely traded company, without a controlling stockholder, 
where the market for its shares has attributes consistent with the assumptions underlying the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis. As a result, I believe that trial courts now can (and often 
should) place heavier reliance on the unaffected market price. 
From my standpoint, this aspect of the Dell and DFC decisions represented a change in direction 
for Delaware appraisal law. Before Dell and DFC, my conceptual framework for approaching the 
determination of fair value called for regarding the trading price with skepticism, while having 
relatively greater confidence in the contemporaneous views of management and other 
sophisticated parties and placing relatively greater reliance on management projections prepared 
in the ordinary course of business. This skeptical approach to market prices did not flow from 
any personal value judgment on my part, but rather from how Delaware Supreme Court 
decisions had treated the unaffected trading price as a valuation indicator. [*18] 61  
The relatively diminished role of the market price in this conceptual framework also influenced 
the circumstances under which I perceived that the deal price would provide reliable evidence of 
fair value. While recognizing the potential relevance of that indicator, I believed that if 
contemporaneous evidence from knowledgeable insiders indicated that the company's market 
price was depressed, then the party arguing for reliance on the deal price (typically the 
respondent) would bear the burden of showing that the process had provided a sufficient 
opportunity for price discovery to warrant regarding the deal price as a reliable indicator of fair 
value.62  I have previously described my then-operative understandings of what this inquiry 
contemplated, so I will not repeat them here.63  
As discussed in greater detail below, the Delaware Supreme Court's decisions in Dell and DFC 
contained an unprecedented level of discussion of the efficient capital markets hypothesis.64  
To my mind, the Delaware Supreme Court's endorsement of the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis suggested a greater (yet still non-mandatory) role for the use of market price when 
determining [*19]  fair value. 
The petitioners are correct that the structure of the Delaware Supreme Court's opinions in Dell 
and DFC permits the interpretation that the Delaware Supreme Court only discussed the efficient 
capital markets hypothesis en route to endorsing a deal-price-less-synergies metric and that the 
discussion might carry no weight for purposes of assessing market price as a separate valuation 
indicator. Both Dell and DFC follow the same broad structure. First, the opinions discussed the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis. Second, they discussed the sale processes and held that the 
processes provided sufficiently reliable evidence of fair value that it constituted an abuse of 
discretion for the trial judge not to have given that indicator greater weight. Third, for 
completeness, they worked through challenges to the discounted cash flow analyses. Finally, 
they remanded the cases so that the trial court could consider giving greater weight to the deal 
price. 
Because of this high-level structure, it is possible to read the decisions as discussing the efficient 
capital markets hypothesis only instrumentally [*20]  in support of a deal-price-less-synergies 
metric. I personally considered that possibility, but after multiple readings of Dell and DFC, 
several factors convinced me that something more was at work. 
First, discussing the efficient capital markets hypothesis did not appear to be logically necessary 
at the appellate level in either Dell or DFC. To endorse the deal price as a valuation indicator, the 
Delaware Supreme Court could have started and finished by discussing the deal process itself 
and explaining why market forces generated a reliable price. The DFC court cited a series of 
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Court of Chancery decisions that had given exclusive weight to the deal price.65  These 
decisions focused on whether the deal price resulted from a "proper transactional process."66  
None of the cited decisions discussed the efficient capital markets hypothesis. Only one—
Autoinfo—considered an argument that the market price was unreliable because the company 
"was thinly traded and lacked financial analyst coverage."67  In addressing this argument, the 
court discussed the sale process and noted that the resulting deal generated a premium of 22% 
over the closing price on the last trading day before the announcement of [*21]  the merger. The 
court concluded that "[w]hile the market may have been uninformed about AutoInfo before the 
sale process, it subsequently gained ample information."68  
The Delaware Supreme Court could have followed a similar course in Dell and DFC by focusing 
on the reliability of the sale process without discussing the efficient capital markets hypothesis or 
the general reliability of market prices.69  Instead, the high court chose to endorse those 
propositions. To my mind, these aspects of the high court's decision carried independent 
doctrinal significance. Moreover, the analytical move seemed particularly meaningful because it 
represented a departure from prior Delaware Supreme Court precedent, which had not previously 
endorsed the efficient capital markets hypothesis and had expressed skepticism about the 
reliability of market prices.70  
Second, the opinions in Dell and DFC did not just mention the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis in passing. Both devoted considerable space to the subject, and both seemed quite 
forceful in their endorsement of market prices as an indicator of value. Here are a selection of 
quotations from Dell and DFC that [*22]  contributed to my impressions on these points: 
• "[T]he Court of Chancery's analysis ignored the efficient capital market hypothesis long 
endorsed by this Court."71  
• "[The efficient capital markets hypothesis] teaches that the price produced by an efficient 
market is generally a more reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a single analyst, 
especially an expert witness who caters her valuation to the litigation imperatives of a well-
heeled client."72  
• "[T]he [efficient market hypothesis] states that the market assessment of value is more accurate, 
on average, than that of any individual, including an appraiser."73  
• "Market prices are typically viewed superior to other valuation techniques because, unlike, e.g., 
a single person's discounted cash flow model, the market price should distill the collective 
judgment of the many based on all the publicly available information about a given company and 
the value of its shares."74  
• When the market for a company's shares is efficient, "a company's stock price 'reflects the 
judgments of many stockholders about the company's future prospects, based on public filings, 
industry information, and research conducted by equity analysts.'"75  
• When the [*23]  market for a company's shares is efficient, "a mass of investors quickly digests 
all publicly available information about a company, and in trading the company's stock, 
recalibrates its price to reflect the market's adjusted, consensus valuation of the company."76  
• "As one textbook puts it, '[i]n an efficient market you can trust prices, for they impound all 
available information about the value of each security.'"77  
• "'For many purposes no formal theory of value is needed. We can take the market's word for 
it.'"78  
• "[T]he relationship between market valuation and fundamental valuation has been strong 
historically."79  
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• "[C]orporate finance theory reflects a belief that if an asset—such as the value of a company as 
reflected in the trading value of its stock—can be subject to close examination and bidding by 
many humans with an incentive to estimate its future cash flows value, the resulting collective 
judgment as to value is likely to be highly informative and that, all estimators having equal 
access to information, the likelihood of outguessing the market over time and building a portfolio 
of stocks beating it is slight."80  
• "[I]t is unlikely that a particular party having the same information [*24]  as other market 
participants will have a judgment about an asset's value that is likely to be more reliable than the 
collective judgment of value embodied in a market price."81  
• Although the market price may not always be right, "one should have little confidence she can 
be the special one able to outwit the larger universe of equally avid capitalists with an incentive 
to reap rewards by buying the asset if it is too cheaply priced."82  
• "[O]n average, market forecasts and market valuations will be at least as accurate as those 
produced by individual investors and appraisers, no matter how expert."83  
• "Like any factor relevant to a company's future performance, the market's collective judgment 
of the effect of regulatory risk may turn out to be wrong, but established corporate finance 
theories suggest that the collective judgment of the many is more likely to be accurate than any 
individual's guess."84  
In Dell, after describing Dell's market capitalization, public float, weekly trading volume, bid-
ask spread, and analyst coverage and the response to the news of the buyout offer, the high court 
observed that "[b]ased on these metrics, the record suggests the market for Dell stock was semi-
strong [*25]  efficient, meaning that the market's digestion and assessment of all publicly 
available information concerning Dell was quickly impounded into the Company's stock 
price."85  In its legal analysis, the Delaware Supreme Court returned to and reiterated these 
points, stressing that the market for Dell's shares was efficient and that it was error to discount 
the trading price.86  To my mind, this degree of emphasis did not seem solely instrumental, but 
rather independently important. 
Third and more generally, HN3  the Delaware Supreme Court stressed in both Dell and DFC 
that the trial courts must take into account accepted financial and economic principles. This 
mandate applies to the trial court's factual findings.87  It extends to the trial court's choice of 
valuation methodologies.88  And it encompasses the final determination of fair value.89  As 
the Delaware Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized in Dell and DFC, the efficient capital 
markets hypothesis is a widely accepted principle in corporate finance.90  It follows that a trial 
court would be obligated to consider the valuation implications of a stock price generated by a 
market having [*26]  attributes consistent with the efficient capital markets hypothesis. 
Fourth, particularly in Dell, the Delaware Supreme Court appeared to regard my failure to give 
weight to the stock price as a separate and distinct source of error. If the petitioners' 
instrumentalist view were correct, one would expect the Delaware Supreme Court to have 
stressed my giving inadequate weight to the deal price (the root cause of the error) and to have 
placed less emphasis on the market price (the instrumental error). Instead, the Delaware Supreme 
Court prominently discussed both as sources of error.91  Most significantly, the Delaware 
Supreme Court specifically identified the failure to give weight to the market price as a 
standalone source of error because the market price itself provided evidence of fair value: "Here, 
the trial court gave no weight to Dell's stock price because it found its market to be inefficient. 
But the evidence suggests that the market for Dell's shares was actually efficient and, therefore, 
likely a possible proxy for fair value."92  This language appeared to me to 
13 
 
recognize [*27]  explicitly that when the market for a company's shares has attributes associated 
with the premises underlying a traditional view of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, and 
the company lacks a controlling stockholder, then the stock market price is "likely a possible 
proxy for fair value."93  
Finally, as a matter of policy, I was aware that some commentators have expressed concern 
about a regime that incentivizes appraisal arbitrage and have contended that the statutory interest 
rate permits appraisal arbitrageurs to generate outsized profits with minimal risk, because the fair 
value determination often comes in at the deal price or slightly below it.94  The Dell and DFC 
decisions appeared to me to be taking steps to moderate the attractiveness of appraisal arbitrage. 
From that standpoint, a rule that channeled outcomes towards the deal price could have the effect 
of bolstering the ability of arbitrageurs to benefit from the interest rate.95  That risk would 
particularly afflict acquisitions by financial sponsors, where the opportunity for operational 
synergies is generally [*28]  reduced. For the Delaware Supreme Court to open up the fair value 
analysis by permitting greater consideration of the unaffected market price seemed to me to be 
directionally consistent with and perhaps the next logical step in the path laid out by Dell and 
DFC. 
Having considered these factors, I concluded that the discussion of the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis in Dell and DFC was not merely deployed instrumentally in support of a deal-price-
less-synergies metric, but rather was intended to have independent doctrinal heft as a means of 
altering the traditional skepticism with which Delaware decisions have approached the stock 
market price when determining fair value. That conclusion represents one individual's reading of 
the operative decisions. For present purposes, however, the possibility that Dell and DFC had 
discussed the efficient capital markets hypothesis only for instrumental purposes was not 
something that I misapprehended. I was aware of that possibility and considered it when issuing 
the Post-Trial Ruling. 
 
 
2. Whether Relying On The Unaffected Market Price Is Ridiculous 
In a stronger variant of their argument that the Post-Trial [*29]  Ruling misapprehended the 
import of Dell and DFC, the petitioners contend that the those decisions could not have meant 
what I interpreted them to mean because using the unaffected market price as evidence of fair 
value is "ridiculous"96  and "absurd."97  I do not share that view. 
The main reason why the petitioners appear to denigrate my reliance on the unaffected market 
price is that it departs from this court's traditional approach to determining fair value, which 
typically relied on multiple metrics, even when appraising a publicly traded company. Indeed, it 
appears that the Post-Trial Ruling may be the first decision to hold that the unaffected market 
price was the best evidence of fair value and award that figure. 
I do not dispute that the Post-Trial Ruling takes an approach that differs from prior Court of 
Chancery precedent. As this decision already has noted, Delaware Supreme Court decisions on 
appraisal that pre-dated Dell and DFC expressed skepticism about the reliability of the market 
price as an indicator of fair value. In my view, Dell and DFC changed things. I regarded the 
Delaware Supreme Court's endorsement of the efficient capital markets hypothesis and its 
emphasis on [*30]  market indicators over the subjective views of knowledgeable insiders as 
altering the decisional landscape and authorizing greater reliance on market value. 
If one jettisons the notion that relying on the market price just isn't done, then it is hard to regard 
using the unaffected market price as ridiculous or absurd, at least for a publicly traded firm that 
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lacks a controlling stockholder and whose shares otherwise trade in a market having attributes 
associated with the assumptions underlying the efficient capital markets hypothesis. HN4  
Reliance on market value is a technique that is "generally considered acceptable in the financial 
community and otherwise admissible in court."98  Prominent legal scholars have recommended 
this approach.99  As suggested by the sources that the Delaware Supreme Court cited, finance 
scholars also endorse it.100  
Once the unaffected market price is no longer regarded as a disfavored metric, then it should not 
be problematic to rely on it exclusively. The Delaware Supreme Court has made clear that HN5
 a trial court can rely on a single valuation methodology.101  While serving on this court, 
Chief Justice Strine invoked a culinary metaphor to argue in favor [*31]  of using one valuation 
technique rather than several: 
As a law-trained judge who has to come up with a valuation deploying the learning of the field of 
corporate finance, I choose to deploy one accepted method as well as I am able, given the record 
before me and my own abilities. Even if one were to conclude that there are multiple ways to 
come up with a discount rate, that does not mean that one should use them all at one time and 
then blend them together. Marc Vetri, Mario Batali, and Lidia Bastianich all make a mean 
marinara sauce. Is the best way to serve a good meal to your guest to cook up each chef's recipe 
and then pour them into a single huge pot? Or is it to make the hard choice among the recipes 
and follow the chosen one as faithfully as a home cook can? This home cook will follow the one 
recipe approach and use the recipe endorsed by Brealey, Myers and Allen and the mainstream of 
corporate finance theory taught in our leading academic institutions . . . .102  
In DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court similarly cautioned against using multiple valuation 
techniques, admonishing that the Court of Chancery "may well feel tempted to turn its valuation 
decisions into a more improvisational [*32]  variation of the old Delaware Block Method, but 
one in which the court takes every valuation method put in the record, gives each equal weight, 
and then divides by the number of them."103  The high court mandated that HN6  if the Court 
of Chancery relies on multiple valuation methods, it "must exercise its considerable discretion 
while also explaining, with reference to the economic facts before it and corporate finance 
principles, why it is according a certain weight to a certain indicator of value."104  The high 
court admonished that "[i]n some cases, it may be that a single valuation metric is the most 
reliable evidence of fair value and that giving weight to another factor will do nothing but distort 
that best estimate."105  
The Dell and DFC decisions observe that HN7  while the unaffected market price need not 
equate to fundamental value, it nevertheless generates a measure of value that is more likely to 
be accurate than other methodologies. "[T]he efficient market hypothesis long endorsed by this 
Court . . . teaches that the price produced by an efficient market is generally a more reliable 
assessment of fair value than the view of a single analyst . . . ."106  
[C]orporate [*33]  finance theory reflects a belief that if an asset—such as the value of a 
company as reflected in the trading value of its stock—can be subject to close examination and 
bidding by many humans with an incentive to estimate its future cash flows value, the resulting 
collective judgment as to value is likely to be highly informative and that, all estimators having 
equal access to information, the likelihood of outguessing the market over time and building a 
portfolio of stocks beating it is slight.107  
A single valuator, such as a trial judge conducting an appraisal, "should have little confidence 
she can be the special one able to outwit the larger universe of equally avid capitalists with an 
incentive to reap rewards by buying the asset if it is too cheaply priced."108  And even a 
15 
 
"market that is not perfectly efficient may still value securities more accurately than appraisers 
who are forced to work with limited information and whose judgments by nature reflect their 
own views and biases."109  Like democracy, the unaffected market price may be imperfect, but 
absent proof undermining its premises, it often will be better than the other metrics that have 
been tried.110  
I therefore [*34]  cannot agree that using the unaffected market price as the most reliable 
indicator of fair value is so ridiculous or absurd as to mean that I misapprehended the law. I do 
not claim to have privileged insight into the high court's intent, and I may well have 
misunderstood the import of Dell and DFC, but that is a matter for appeal, not for a motion for 
reargument. 
 
 
3. An Outcome That No Litigant Proposed 
A third reason that the petitioners regard the Post-Trial Ruling as necessarily misapprehending 
Dell and DFC is because it resulted in a fair value conclusion "that no litigant would even ask 
for."111  The assertion that no litigant would ask for an award equal to the unaffected trading 
price seems limited to the facts of this case. If respondents in appraisal proceedings believe that 
the facts and the law can support an appraisal award equal to the unaffected trading price, they 
doubtless will ask for that outcome. 
Limiting the assertion to the facts of this case, the respondent actually did propose that I rely on 
the unaffected market price.112  In every one of its briefs, the respondent argued that Aruba's 
unaffected trading price of $17.13 per share was informative of fair value.113  
Moreover, [*35]  in its post-trial brief on the implications of Dell, the respondent advanced the 
following proposition: "[I]n response to the Supreme Court's recent guidance in Dell and [DFC], 
Aruba now understands that its pre-transaction market price is indeed the single most important 
mark of its fair value."114  Consequently, the respondent asserted that "the Court should find 
fair value to be Aruba's 30-day unaffected market price of $17.13."115  
But the picture is more complicated, because what actually happened is that the respondent's 
valuation position evolved over the course of the case. As the Post-Trial Ruling explained, 
During discovery and at trial, both sides focused on their experts' discounted cash flow 
valuations. As the number of opinions that focused on the deal price mounted, the respondent 
placed greater emphasis on that metric, and the petitioners responded by attacking the process 
that led to the deal. After DFC, the respondent stressed a combination of the unaffected market 
price and the deal price. After Dell, the respondent redoubled its emphasis on the combination of 
the unaffected market price and the deal price.116  
During post-trial argument, before the parties provided their [*36]  supplemental submissions on 
Dell, the petitioners chastised the respondent for presenting a moving target in its valuation 
assertions.117  In response, the respondent cited various valuation indications, including the 
unaffected market price, but counsel ultimately asserted that they were relying on their expert's 
updated valuation opinion of $19.75 per share as their valuation contention.118  
Taking this history into account, I thought it reasonable when making my fair value 
determination to regard the respondent as bound by their contention that the minimum fair value 
for Aruba was $19.75 per share. Given this fact, I debated whether I should award what I 
believed represented the most reliable estimate of fair value, or whether, notwithstanding my 
belief, I should award $19.75 on the theory that the respondent should be estopped from 
benefitting from a valuation lower than what it had endorsed. 
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I ultimately found persuasive the authorities which require this court to make its own, 
independent valuation determination.119  I also was concerned, as a matter of policy, that to 
hold that a court would not go outside the range of fair value established by the parties might 
further incentivize parties [*37]  to adopt extreme valuation positions as a means of demarcating 
the widest possible field in which the court could exercise its discretion. 
On different facts, holding a party to its valuation contention might be warranted. For present 
purposes, however, because I considered the issue when issuing the Post-Trial Ruling, it does not 
result in a misapprehension of fact or law that would support a motion for reargument. 
 
 
C. Objections To My Good Faith In Rendering The Post-Trial Ruling 
The petitioners' final two arguments question my good faith in issuing the Post-Trial Ruling. The 
short answer is that notwithstanding the petitioners' suspicions, I honestly did the best I could. 
 
 
1. An Act Of Political Theater 
The petitioners initially argue that I issued the Post-Trial Ruling as an act of political theater 
designed to show the Delaware Supreme Court the error of its ways. They sympathize that the 
Post-Trial Ruling must reflect my "frustration with many of the Supreme Court's 
pronouncements,"120  only to posit that this frustration led me to pen a decision designed to 
show "the absurdity of the literal application of certain pronouncements [*38]  made by the 
Supreme Court in Dell and DFC to appraisal actions."121  They conclude that I must be 
engaging in a "battle of legal titans" with the Delaware Supreme Court and that the emotional 
fervor of intellectual combat led me to impose an unjust ruling.122  The motion strives to 
remind me that the petitioners are not characters in an academic hypothetical but "real" litigants 
with "real dollars at stake" who should not be turned into "collateral damage."123  
Technically, this argument neither contends that I "overlooked a decision or principle of law that 
would have controlling effect," nor that I "misapprehended the law or the facts so that the 
outcome of the decision would be affected."124  At one level, it contends that I apprehended the 
language of Dell and DFC too well and took it too seriously. Read fairly, however, it contends 
that I did not carry out the judicial task of rendering a decision based on the applicable law and 
the facts of the case, but rather sacrificed the petitioners' interests because of intellectual vanity. 
If this were true, it would seem to me to provide a legitimate basis for reargument. Indeed, in my 
view it would provide grounds for vacating the decision and [*39]  asking the Chancellor to 
reassign the case to a colleague who could carry out the responsibilities of a judicial officer. 
Those responsibilities include that a judge "perform the duties of the office impartially and 
diligently"125  and be "unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism."126  
If the petitioners were correct, then I permitted partisan intellectual interests to affect my 
impartiality and sway the outcome. 
Recognizing that the human mind does not offer an Archimedean perch for self-assessment, I 
nevertheless have sought to take seriously the petitioners' assertion that I did not try in good faith 
to follow Dell and DFC. Rather than rejecting the petitioners' rather extraordinary position at 
face value, I have carefully re-read DFC, Dell, and other appraisal authorities, and I have re-read 
the Post Trial Ruling with the petitioner's concern squarely in mind. 
After undertaking this process, I do not believe that petitioner's contention is accurate. I 
personally do not believe that I issued the Post-Trial Ruling out of frustration. To the contrary, I 
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personally believe that I engaged in a lengthy, laborious (in both senses), and reasoned effort to 
implement [*40]  Delaware Supreme Court precedent. 
For starters, I am lot a legal titan. I am a state court trial judge. I personally do not think that the 
role of a trial judge accommodates active resistance to Delaware Supreme Court 
pronouncements. I rather view the job as calling for adherence to Delaware Supreme Court 
precedent. While I think it is fair game for a trial judge to suggest potential changes in the 
law,127  I do not believe that a trial judge has the flexibility to disregard the Delaware Supreme 
Court's holdings, nor do I think that a trial judge should look for clever ways to evade their 
implications. When a new precedent arrives, I view my job as requiring that I update my 
understanding of Delaware law to incorporate the new precedent. 
That is what I tried to do in this case. As this decision already has discussed at length, I made this 
effort when evaluating the persuasiveness of the unaffected market price. 
I made a similar effort when evaluating the persuasiveness of the deal price. As discussed in the 
Post-Trial Ruling, the petitioners in this case proved that the sale process had flaws,128  so it 
was critical for me to attempt to understand whether the deal price could [*41]  be regarded as a 
reliable valuation indicator under the framework envisioned by Dell and DFC. From a 
conceptual standpoint, I imagined four hypothetical bands of deal-price reliability, ranging from 
the most reliable to least reliable: 
• Band 1: A sale process is so well-constructed and well-executed that a trial court would err by 
not giving the deal price heavy, if not dispositive, weight. 
• Band 2: A sale process is sufficiently good that the trial court would err by not treating the deal 
price as a reliable valuation indicator, but the trial court would not commit error by failing to 
give the deal price heavy, if not dispositive, weight. 
• Band 3: The sale process is sufficiently flawed that the trial court could determine without 
erring that the deal price was not a reliable valuation indicator. 
• Band 4: The sale process is so flawed that the trial court would err by treating the deal price as 
a reliable valuation indicator. 
Although I have described these bands as separate domains, the lines between them necessarily 
will be fact-specific and fuzzy. 
In this case, the petitioners argued that the sale process fell squarely into Band 4 or, at worst, in 
the lower range of Band 3. The [*42]  respondent argued that the sale process fell within Band 1 
or, at worst, within Band 2. As I read Dell and DFC, those decisions placed the deal prices in 
those cases in Band 1. At the trial level in DFC, Chancellor Bouchard found that the sale process 
was sufficiently reliable to warrant consideration as a valuation indicator, and he gave it one-
third weight. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding that "under the conditions found by 
the Court of Chancery, economic principles suggest that the best evidence of fair value was the 
deal price."129  Likewise in Dell, I found that the sale process was sufficiently reliable to 
exclude outlier valuations like the twice-the-deal-price figure that the petitioners advanced, and I 
relied on it to that extent. But I found that the sale process was not sufficiently reliable to rule out 
a smaller valuation discrepancy. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, concluding that "the 
deal price deserved heavy, if not dispositive, weight."130  
Because the holdings in Dell and DFC addressed when a deal price fell within Band 1, they 
logically did not have implications for when a sale process would be so flawed as to require 
placing the deal price in Band 4, nor [*43]  for demarcating the boundary between Bands 4 and 
3, or between Bands 3 and 2. Technically, the holdings did not even clearly delineate the border 
between Bands 2 and 1. The Delaware Supreme Court placed both deal prices into Band 1, but 
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the high court might have believed the sale processes were so good that they fell into an upper 
register of Band 1, without excluding the possibility that a not-as-good sale process still could 
generate a deal price warranting Band 1 treatment. 
After I issued the Post-Trial Ruling, Vice Chancellor Glasscock issued his decision in AOL.131  
He derived sale process characteristics from Dell and declined to give any weight to a sale 
process that he found was not "Dell Compliant."132  This outcome suggests to me that he 
viewed whether a transaction is "Dell Compliant" as demarcating the point within Band 2 at 
which a trial judge could opt to disregard the deal price. 
I obviously did not have the benefit of AOL when reasoning through these issues, but I 
considered similar questions. After pondering Dell and DFC, those decisions seemed to me to 
imply that a deal price fell above the point of disregard and should be considered as a valuation 
indicator if the [*44]  transaction did not involve a controlling stockholder and was otherwise at 
arm's length. This is a lower standard than the "Dell Compliant" concept. 
I derived my lower test from a confluence of factors, including the following: 
• In both Dell and DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court linked the purpose of an appraisal to 
whether the transaction involved a third-party buyer. 
○ "[T]he purpose of an appraisal . . . is to make sure that [the petitioners] receive fair 
compensation for their shares in the sense that it reflects what they deserve to receive based on 
what would fairly be given to them in an arm's-length transaction."133  
○ Fair value for purposes of appraisal "means a price that is one that a reasonable seller, under all 
of the circumstances, would regard as within a range of fair value; one that such a seller could 
reasonably accept."134  
○ "[T]he key inquiry [in an appraisal] is whether the dissenters got fair value and were not 
exploited."135  
•In both cases, the Delaware Supreme Court seemed to discount the importance of considering 
whether a different or more open sale process might have generated a higher value. 
○ "[T]he purpose of an appraisal is not to make sure that the petitioners get the [*45]  highest 
conceivable value that might have been procured had every domino fallen out of the company's 
way . . . ."136  
○ "[F]air value is just that, 'fair.' It does not mean the highest possible price that a company 
might have sold for had Warren Buffett negotiated for it on his best day and the Lenape who sold 
Manhattan on their worst."137  
○ "To be sure, 'fair value' does not equal 'best value.'"138  
○ "The issue in an appraisal is not whether a negotiator has extracted the highest possible 
bid."139  
• The Delaware Supreme Court placed the Dell transaction in Band 4 even though the transaction 
was a management buy-out in which Michael Dell, the eponymous founder, CEO, and largest 
blockholder, was a net buyer of shares. 
• In Dell, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected as a matter of law the possibility that a sale 
process involving homogenous bidders operating within the confines of a leveraged buy-out 
model could fall short of the valuation that would be placed on the entity by a diversified group 
of public owners. 
Based on these factors, I concluded that although the sale process in Aruba had flaws, the deal 
price warranted consideration as a reliable valuation indicator.140  
My assessment of the Aruba [*46]  sale process in light of Dell and DFC meant that I had two 
reliable indications of value: the unaffected market price and the deal price. At that point, I had 
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to determine how to weigh, choose between, or otherwise evaluate the two indications. I have 
already described the thought process that led me to select the unaffected market price as the 
most reliable indicator of fair value. 
I thus submit that the Post-Trial Ruling resulted from my efforts to reason through the Dell and 
DFC decisions and apply them to the facts presented. That said, I cannot fault the petitioners for 
inferring some frustration on my part. Most notably, at one point in the Post-Trial Ruling, I 
included a footnote detailing the record evidence that I relied on when rendering my factual 
finding in Dell about the existence of a valuation gap.141  Having re-read this language in light 
of the Reargument Motion, I understand how it could sound petulant. 
I did not include that footnote gratuitously. Rather, I included it to emphasize why what I 
regarded as the far less extensive and persuasive evidence presented in this case would not be 
sufficient to support a factual finding in the petitioners' favor. In the face of more 
extensive [*47]  evidence in Dell, the Delaware Supreme Court had concluded that "[t]he record 
before us provides no rational, factual basis for such a 'valuation gap'"142  and that "[t]here is 
also no evidence in the record that investors were 'myopic' or shortsighted."143  As I noted in 
the Post-Trial Ruling, these holdings by the high court demonstrated that the justices regarded 
the comparatively more extensive showing in Dell as "the equivalent of no evidence at all."144  
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed or criticized many other aspects of my trial level rulings 
in Dell. I did not use the Post-Trial Ruling as a platform for engaging in debate on any of those 
points. The footnote regarding the evidentiary basis for my finding in Dell was relevant to and 
supported my decision not to rely on weaker evidence in the Post-Trial Ruling. Nevertheless, 
given how it evidently came across, I should have phrased that footnote differently. If the 
Reargument Motion is a guide, the footnote missed its intended mark and detracted from the 
reasoning in the Post-Trial Ruling. That is a helpful lesson, but I do not believe that the 
misimpression I inadvertently created warrants granting reargument. 
 
 
2. Judicial Oath Breaking [*48]  
The petitioners also argue that I could not have issued the Post-Trial Ruling in good faith without 
violating my oath as a judge. They assert that even if I believed in good faith that I was properly 
applying the teachings of Dell and DFC and that those decisions authorized a trial court to rely 
exclusively on the unaffected market price, I still should not have accepted that outcome because 
of my "oath to Delaware to uphold the Delaware Constitution, which creates three branches of 
government, including the legislature."145  The petitioners claim that the Post-Trial Ruling 
somehow violated that oath because using the unaffected market price as an indicator of fair 
value would mean, as a practical matter, "that there can never be an appraisal for a public 
company receiving a premium offer, regardless of the size of that premium"146  and would 
"eliminate[] the statutory right to appraisal provided by the General Assembly in the context of a 
publicly traded company."147  
I do not agree that my reading of Dell and DFC means "that there can never be an appraisal for a 
public company receiving a premium offer, regardless of the size of that premium."148  The 
common law develops incrementally, case [*49]  by case. As the Post-Trial Ruling noted, 
"[p]erhaps future appraisal litigants will retain experts on market efficiency, as is common in 
federal securities actions, and maybe future appraisal decisions will consider subtler aspects of 
the efficient capital markets hypothesis."149  Depending on the facts and the persuasiveness of 
the experts, future petitioners might demonstrate that the trading price is not a reliable indicator 
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of value. Or perhaps future petitioners will demonstrate the existence of information that was 
unknown to the market and argue for a specific valuation impact. Doubtless other possibilities 
are possible. 
Equally important, it does not violate the Delaware Constitution for the Delaware Supreme Court 
to interpret the appraisal statute, even if it refines the litigation target zone for petitioners in 
appraisal proceedings. "In our constitutional system, this Court's role is to interpret the statutory 
language that the General Assembly actually adopts, even if unclear and explain what we 
ascertain to be the legislative intent without rewriting the statute to fit a particular policy 
position."150  HN9  "[T]he Constitution invests the Judiciary, not the Legislature, with 
the [*50]  final power to construe the law."151  The interpretation of statutory text is "one of the 
Judiciary's characteristic roles."152  The Delaware courts play a particularly significant role in 
the corporate arena,153  where historically the judiciary, rather than the General Assembly, has 
taken the lead.154  
For nearly seventy years, the Delaware Supreme Court has spoken authoritatively on the 
standard for value under the appraisal statute and the weight to be given various types of 
evidence within that valuation framework. The Delaware Supreme Court first addressed the 
governing standard of value in Battye,155  then again in Weinberger,156  and subsequently in 
decisions like Cavalier Oil,157  Rapid-American,158  and Technicolor II.159  The high court 
has now continued its interpretive role in Dell and DFC, to which important and controversial 
legal rules are promulgated by the judiciary, [*51]  rather than enacted by the legislature."). 
A trial judge's oath is not a license to disregard the Delaware Supreme Court's rulings. DFC and 
Dell reflect authoritative statements of appraisal law. For purposes of the separation of powers, if 
the high court has moved in a direction contrary to the General Assembly's liking, the General 
Assembly can amend the appraisal statute. The dynamic interplay among the constitutional 
branches of government fulfills, rather than contravenes, the constitutional scheme. 
 
 
II. CONCLUSION 
The Reargument Motion is denied. The parties shall cooperate in preparing a final order that will 
bring this case to conclusion at the trial court level. 
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369 n.118 (explaining that discounted cash flow models are "often used in appraisal proceedings 
when the respondent company was not public or was not sold in an open market check"). 
8  
Post-Trial Ruling, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, 2018 WL 922139, at *2, *52-53. 
9  
2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, [WL] at *1, *25-28, *51. 
10  
2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, [WL] at *1, *34. 
11  
8 Del. C. § 262(h); see also Dell, 177 A.3d at 20; DFC, 172 A.2d at 364, 368. 
12  
Post-Trial Ruling, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, 2018 WL 922139, at *2, *45. 
13  
See 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, [WL] at *2, *44-45, *53-54. 
14  
See William J. Carney & Mark Heimendinger, Appraising the Nonexistent: The Delaware 
Court's Struggle with Control Premiums, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 845, 847-48, 857-58, 861-66 (2003) 
[hereinafter Control Premiums]; Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Rationalizing 
Appraisal Standards in Compulsory Buyouts, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1021, 1023-24, 1034-35, 1044, 
1046-54, 1067 (2009) [hereinafter Rationalizing Appraisal]; Lawrence A. Hamermesh & 
Michael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling Life of the "Implicit Minority Discount" in 
Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1, 30-36, 49, 52, 60 (2007) [hereinafter Implicit 
Minority Discount]; Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of 
Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. Corp. L. 119, 128, 132-33, 139-42 (2005) 
[hereinafter Fair Value of Cornfields]. 
15  
8 Del. C. § 262(h); see M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert 731 A.2d 790 (Del. 1999) ("Fair value, as 
used in § 262(h), Is more properly described as the value of the company to the stockholder as a 
going concern, rather than its value to a third party as an acquisition."); see also Rationalizing 
Appraisal, supra, at 1038 ("[T]hird-party sale value is an inappropriate standard for determining 
the fair value of dissenting shares because it incorporates elements of value—associated with 
acquisitions of control by third parties—that do not belong to the acquired enterprise or to shares 
of stock in that enterprise."); Implicit Minority Discount, supra, at 30 ("The value of the firm is 
not its third-party sale value (V3ps). In an arm's-length transaction, an acquirer will pay a 
premium to Ve in purchasing the firm. The premium largely reflects synergies arising from the 
merger, but it can also reflect benefits of control."); Fair Value of Cornfields, supra, at 148 
("[E]xcluded gains [for purposes of appraisal] include, for example, those resulting from 
economies of scale or increased market share, or those that result from the acquirer's plans to 
operate the post-merger enterprise more efficiently."); id. at 151 (concluding that Section 262(h) 
excludes value arising from both "synergies dependent on the consummation of an arm's-length 
acquisition" and "operating efficiencies that arise from the acquirer's new business plans"). 
16  
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See Rationalizing Appraisal, supra, at 1055 (discussing an acquisition of a widely held firm and 
explaining that "the firm's going concern value can be estimated in this case as the actual 
purchase price minus synergies minus control value"). 
17  
See Richard A. Booth, Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in Appraisal Proceedings, 57 
Bus. Law. 127, 151 n.130 (2001) ("[M]arket price should ordinarily equal going concern value if 
the market is efficient."); Control Premiums, supra, at 857-58 ("The basic conclusion of the 
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) is that market values of companies' shares traded 
in competitive and open markets are unbiased estimates of the value of the equity of such 
firms."); id. at 879 (noting that the appraisal statute requires consideration of all relevant factors 
and stating that "in an efficient market, absent information about some market failure, market 
price is the only relevant factor"); Implicit Minority Discount, supra, at 52 ("Take the case of a 
publicly traded company that has no controller. Efficient market theory states that the shares of 
this company trade at the pro rata value of the corporation as a going concern."); id. at 60 ("As a 
matter of generally accepted financial theory . . . , share prices in liquid and informed markets do 
generally represent th[e] going concern value . . . ."). 
18  
See Post-Trial Ruling, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, 2018 WL 922139, at *4, *55. 
19  
See Ct. Ch. R. 59(f). 
20  
Dkt. 190 (the "Reargument Motion"). 
21  
Miles, Inc. v. Cookson Am., Inc., 677 A.2d 505, 506 (Del. Ch. 1995) (quoting Stein v. Orloff, 
1985 Del. Ch. LEXIS 540, 1985 WL 21136, at *2 (Del. Ch. 1985)). 
22  
Sunrise Ventures, LLC v. Rehoboth Canal Ventures, LLC, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 47, 2010 WL 
975581, at *1 (Del. Ch.) (Strine, V.C.), aff'd, 7 A.3d 485 (Del. 2010) (TABLE). 
23  
Id. See generally Donald J. Wolfe, Jr. & Michael A. Pittenger, Corporate and Commercial 
Practice in the Delaware Court of Chancery § 4.09 (2015) (explaining that a "motion for 
reargument may not introduce any new legal theories or issues that could have been raised" but 
were not). 
24  
Lechliter v. Del. Dep't of Nat. Res., 2016 WL 878121, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2016); accord 
McElroy v. Shell Petroleum, Inc., 618 A.2d 91, 1992 Del. LEXIS 449, 1992 WL 397468, at *1 
(Del. 1992) (TABLE) ("A motion for reargument is not intended to rehash the arguments already 
decided by the court."). 
25  
Zutrau v. Jansing, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 257, 2014 WL 6901461, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 8, 2014), 
aff'd, 123 A.3d 938 (Del. 2015). 
26  
Reargument Mot. ¶ 1. 
27  
Id. 
28  
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Id. ¶ 4. 
29  
Id. ¶ 5. 
30  
Id. ¶ 7. 
31  
Id. 
32  
Id. ¶ 8. 
33  
Id. ¶ 9 
34  
Id. 
35  
Id. 
36  
Id. ¶ 7. 
37  
Id. 
38  
Id. 
39  
Id. ¶ 7 n.8. 
40  
See, e.g., Dkt. 163 at 1 ("[HP] paid $24.67 per share for [Aruba]—a significant premium over 
the unaffected market value of $17.13 per share."); id. at 3 ("Aruba's 30 day average unaffected 
market price was $17.13 . . . ."); id. at 37 ("The market for Aruba stock was a 'thick and efficient' 
one, such that Aruba's stock price reflected its going concern value."); Dkt. 167 at 1 ("Marcus' 
valuation far exceeds . . . Aruba's unaffected market value of $17.13."); id. at 2 ("Dages' analysis 
is also consistent with how the market . . . valued Aruba."); id. ("Aruba's share price was not, as 
Verition contends, trading in an [sic] 'trough,' but reflected an efficient market's concerns about 
Aruba's future." (internal citations omitted)); id. at 6 ("Verition . . . does not contend that the 
market for Aruba's stock was not efficient."); id. (arguing that Aruba had positive and negative 
aspects, "all of which the market knew and incorporated into Aruba's stock price"); Dkt. 174 at 1 
("[DFC] confirms Aruba's position that the Court should reject Verition's proposed DCF fair 
value of $32.57 and adopt Aruba's proposed DCF fair value of $19.75 because the latter is 
consistent with . . . Aruba's pre-transaction trading price of $17.13 . . . ."); id. ("DFC makes clear 
that Aruba's pre-transaction trading price is relevant to fair value and negates certain of 
Verition's challenges to the deal process."); id. ("[T]he fact that the market for Aruba stock is 
informationally efficient refutes Verition's argument that the deal price was negotiated while 
Aruba traded in an artificial 'trough.'"); id. at 3 ("DFC Shows That Aruba's Market Price Of 
$17.13 Is Informative Of Fair Value."); id. at 15 (arguing that the court should consider "the 
market price"); Dkt. 178 at 97-98 ("I would submit that these four numbers, Aruba's unaffected 
contemporaneous market price of [$]17.13 a share, the merger price of [$]24.67 a share as a 
ceiling, and HP's valuation . . . of Aruba at [$]19.10 a share, and the DCF valuation of Mr. Dages 
of no greater than [$]19.75 a share, all cluster around the same valuation range."); id. at 98-104 
24 
 
(discussing relevance of unaffected market price of $17.13 per share as indicator of fair value); 
Dkt. 188 at 1 ("[Dell] confirms Aruba's position that the Court must consider Aruba's pre-
transaction market price of $17.13 as both an independent indicator of Aruba's fair value and as a 
reliable anchor for the $24.67 merger price less shared synergies."); id. at 2 ("[T]he Court should 
consider Dages' imminently reasonable $19.75 DCF as yet another check that confirms the 
reliability of the $17.13 market price, and reject Marcus' $32.57 DCF as there is no rational, 
factual basis for the 90% valuation gap between this and the market price."); id. at 14 (arguing 
for reliance on "Aruba's 30-day unaffected market price of $17.13"). 
41  
See, e.g., Dkt. 163 at 1 (respondent's answering post-trial brief: "[HP] paid $24.67 per share for 
[Aruba]—a significant premium over the unaffected market price of $17.13 per share."); Dkt. 
167 at 1 (respondent's post-trial sur-reply brief: "Marcus' valuation far exceeds . . . Aruba's 
unaffected market value of $17.13."); Dkt. 174 at 1 (respondent's supplemental post-trial brief on 
DFC: "[DFC] confirms Aruba's position that the Court should reject Verition's proposed DCF 
fair value of $32.57 and adopt Aruba's proposed DCF fair value of $19.75 because the latter is 
consistent with . . . Aruba's pre-transaction trading price of $17.13 . . . ."); Dkt. 178 at 97-98 
(respondent's counsel beginning his argument during the post-trial hearing: "I would submit that 
these four numbers, Aruba's unaffected contemporaneous market price of [$]17.13 a share, the 
merger price of [$]24.67 a share as a ceiling, and HP's valuation . . . of Aruba at [$]19.10 a share, 
and the DCF valuation of Mr. Dages of no greater than [$]19.75 a share, all cluster around the 
same valuation range."); id. at 98-104 (discussing relevance of unaffected market price of $17.13 
per share as indicator of fair value); Dkt. 188 at 1 (respondent's supplemental post-trial brief on 
Dell: "[Dell] confirms Aruba's position that the Court must consider Aruba's pre-transaction 
market price of $17.13 as both an independent indicator of Aruba's fair value and as a reliable 
anchor for the $24.67 merger price less shared synergies."); id. ("[I]n response to the Supreme 
Court's recent guidance in Dell and [DFC], Aruba now understands that its pre-transaction 
market price is indeed the single most important mark of its fair value." (footnote omitted)). 
42  
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983); see Dkt. 192 ¶ 9 n.8 (citing Arthur J. 
Keown & John M. Pinkerton, Merger Announcements and Insider Trading Activity: An 
Empirical Investigation, 36 J. Fin. 855, 866 (1981) for the proposition that "a 30-day average has 
the benefit of correcting for 'what appears to be common knowledge on the street: impending 
merger announcements are poorly held secrets'"). Given the strictures of Rule 59(f) and the fact 
that the petitioners had not previously raised the issue, I have not delved into the valuation and 
academic literature on this point, but I suspect many treatises and other articles could be cited to 
support the general acceptance of a 30-day average as a common metric for calculating the 
unaffected trading price. 
43  
See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, 1990 WL 201390, at *29 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 1990) (explaining that it "was not improper, as a matter of law," to base the 
unaffected market price on either "the day prior to the offer announcement" or a day "30 days 
prior to the merger announcement"), aff'd, 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992); In re Olivetti Underwood 
Corp., 246 A.2d 800, 805 (Del. Ch. 1968) (declining to recognize any rule of law mandating a 
particular measurement period and finding that an average was reasonable). 
44  
Reargument Mot. ¶ 8. 
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45  
Post-Trial Ruling, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, 2018 WL 922139, at *53. 
46  
See Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189, 2016 WL 
7324170, at *23-26 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016); In re Appraisal of Dell Inc. (Dell Trial Fair Value), 
2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, 2016 WL 3186538, at *21 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016), aff'd 
in [*12]  part, rev'd in part sub nom. Dell, 177 A.3d 1. 
47  
Post-Trial Ruling, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, 2018 WL 922139, at *53. 
48  
See Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Gp. Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 358 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
(describing the temporal gap as a "quibble" and "not a forceful objection"). 
49  
See Zutrau, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 257, 2014 WL 6901461, at *2 (finding "[m]ere disagreement 
with the Court's resolution of a matter" to be insufficient grounds for reargument.). 
50  
Reargument Mot. ¶ 5. 
51  
Id. ¶ 4. 
52  
See, e.g., Post-Trial Ruling, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, 2018 WL 922139, at *24 ("The Delaware 
Supreme Court's recent decisions in DFC and Dell teach that if a company's shares trade in a 
market having attributes consistent with the assumptions underlying a traditional version of the 
semi-strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, then the unaffected trading price 
provides evidence of the fair value of a proportionate interest in the company as a going 
concern." (footnote omitted)); see also 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, [WL] at *25, *30, *31 n.207, 
*34. 
53  
See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. Fin. 383 (1970). 
54  
Post-Trial Ruling, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, 2018 WL 922139, at *33 (footnotes omitted). 
55  
2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, [WL] at *34. 
56  
8 Del. C. § 262(h). 
57  
See Post-Trial Ruling, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, 2018 WL 922139, at *35 (noting that 
"[r]eleasing information simultaneously or in close proximity might make it difficult for an 
expert to disentangle the price reaction"). 
58  
See 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, [WL] at *28-34. 
59  
Reargument Mot. ¶ 6. 
60  
Id. ¶ 4. 
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61  
See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor II), 684 A.2d 289, 301 (Del. 1996) 
(observing, in context of appraisal of publicly traded company following arm's-length deal, that 
the "market price of shares may not be representative of fair value" (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 n.12 (Del. 
1989))); Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 806 (Del. 1992) (describing the Court 
of Chancery's rejection of market value in Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 
(Del. Ch. 1934), and observing that "Munds' succinct evaluation of the market has lost none of 
its lustre"); see also Glassman v. Unocal Expl. Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001) (stating that 
if a transaction "was timed to take advantage of a depressed market, or a low point in the 
company's cyclical earnings, or to precede an anticipated positive development, the appraised 
value may be adjusted to account for those factors"). See generally Implicit Minority Discount, 
supra, at 8 ("Delaware appraisal law has never been particularly friendly to the idea that stock 
market prices always accurately represent a proportional share of the value of the enterprise as a 
going concern."). 
62  
See M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 520 (Del. 1999) ("In a statutory 
appraisal proceeding, both sides have the burden of proving their respective valuation positions 
by a preponderance of evidence."). 
63  
See Dell Trial Fair Value, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, 2016 WL 3186538, at *22-28; Lender 
Processing, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189, 2016 WL 7324170, at *14-26. 
64  
I use "unprecedented" descriptively and without intending any pejorative connotation to mean 
literally without prior Delaware Supreme Court precedent. I personally have been unable to 
locate a single Delaware Supreme Court decision before Dell and DFC that mentioned the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis by name, much less cited it with approval. Among various 
research efforts, I queried the Delaware cases database on Westlaw (DE-CS) with a broad search 
(efficient †5 market), then limited the results to Delaware Supreme Court decisions. The results 
consisted of nine opinions, including Dell and DFC. Of the remaining seven, three explained that 
uniform interpretations of standard provisions in indentures and other commercial documents 
promote the "efficient working of capital markets." See Caspian Alpha Long Credit Fund, L.P. v. 
GS Mezzanine P'rs 2006 L.P., 93 A.3d 1203, 1206 n.9 (Del. 2014) (quoting Sharon Steel Corp. 
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982)); RAA Mgmt., LLC v. 
Savage Sports Hldgs., Inc., 45 A.3d 107, 119 (Del. 2012); Kaiser Aluminum Corp. v. Matheson, 
681 A.2d 392, 398 (Del. 1996) (quoting Sharon Steel, 691 F.2d 1039). A fourth used the phrase 
when describing the defendants' rationale for proceeding with a controlling-stockholder 
acquisition that the plaintiffs had challenged. See Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 
1229 (Del. 2012) (noting that the defendants contended that a stock-for-stock merger would 
increase the number of outstanding shares, which would "improve stockholder liquidity, generate 
more analyst exposure, and create a more efficient market for Southern Peru shares"). A fifth 
quoted my observation in a post-trial decision that "the reliability of an observed beta depends on 
an efficient trading market." RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 867 (Del. 2015) 
(quoting In re Rural Metro Corp. S'holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 108-09 (Del. Ch. 2014)). 
The last two of the pre-Dell and DFC decisions involved appraisal cases. In one, the Delaware 
Supreme Court referred to the "efficient market" when describing the respondent's request on 
27 
 
appeal for the creation of a presumption that the deal price equated to fair value, which the high 
court declined to adopt. See Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT LP, 11 A.3d 214, 216 (Del. 2010) 
("Supported by the arms-length nature of the merger and the efficient market price, Golden 
contends that the merger price indicated Golden's fair value for purposes of appraisal."). The 
final decision cited Eugene Fama's seminal Efficient Capital Markets in support of the 
observation that "[i]nformation and insight not communicated to the market may not be reflected 
in stock prices; thus, minority stockholders being cashed out may be deprived of part of the true 
investment value of their shares." Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor I), 542 A.2d 
1182, 1187 n.8 (Del. 1988). The only substantive reference—Technicolor I—thus cut against 
relying on the efficient capital markets hypothesis, not in favor of it, as did the eventual outcome 
in that case. 
In the interest of completeness, there is one pre-DFC decision from the Delaware Supreme Court 
that referred favorably to market price as a method of determining value. See Applebaum v. 
Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880 (Del. 2002). The Applebaum decision interpreted Section 155(2) of 
the Delaware General Corporation Law, which states that when a reverse stock split or other 
transaction generates fractional shares, a corporation may "pay in cash the fair value of fractions 
of a share as of the time when those entitled to receive such fractions are determined." 8 Del. C. 
§ 155(2). A corporation used the market price to determine the amount due for factional shares 
following a reverse stock split. The Court of Chancery upheld this determination, and the 
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, stating that "the Vice Chancellor properly held that the 
trading price of actively-traded stock of a corporation, the stock of which is widely held, will 
provide an adequate measure of fair value for the stockholders' fractional interests for purposes 
of a reverse stock split under Section 155." Applebaum, 812 A.2d at 883. The high court later 
reiterated that "[t]he Vice Chancellor correctly concluded that a well-informed, liquid trading 
market will provide a measure of fair value superior to any estimate the court could impose." Id. 
at 890. The court cautioned, however, that "market price is not employed in all valuation 
contexts," citing both the appraisal statute and Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 
1985). See Applebaum, 812 A.2d at 889 & n.28. 
65  
See DFC, 172 A.3d at 364 n.84 (citing In re PetSmart, Inc., 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 89, 2017 WL 
2303599 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017); Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 268, 2015 WL 6164771 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015); LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron 
Int'l Corp., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177, 2015 WL 4540443 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015); Merlin P'rs 
LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 128, 2015 WL 2069417 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015); In 
re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21, 2015 WL 399726 (Del. Ch. Jan. 
30, 2015); Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 269, 2013 WL 5878807 
(Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013); Union Ill., 847 A.2d 340). 
66  
Ramtron, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177, 2015 WL 4540443, at *20; accord PetSmart, 2017 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 89, 2017 WL 2303599, at *31; see also BMC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 268, 2015 WL 
6164771, at *17 ("robust, arm's-length sales process"); Ancestry.com, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21, 
2015 WL 399726, at *16 ("[T]he process here . . . appears to me to represent an auction of the 
Company that is unlikely to have left significant stockholder value unaccounted for."). 
67  
2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 128, 2015 WL 2069417, at *12. 
68  
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Id. 
69  
See, e.g., DFC, 172 A.3d at 366 ("[W]e have little quibble with the economic argument that the 
price of a merger that results from a robust market check, against the back drop of a rich 
information base and a welcoming environment for potential buyers, is probative of the 
company's fair value."); id. ("[O]ur refusal to craft a statutory presumption in favor of the deal 
price . . . does not in any way signal our ignorance to the economic reality that the sale value 
resulting from a robust market check will often be the most reliable evidence of fair value . . . ."). 
70  
See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. 
71  
Dell, 177 A.3d at 24. 
72  
Id. 
73  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 367 n.104 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Bradford Cornell, Corporate Valuation 47 (1999)). 
74  
Id. at 369-70. 
75  
Dell, 177 A.3d at 25 (quoting DFC, 172 A.3d at 373-74). 
76  
Id. (citing DFC, 172 A.3d at 370). 
77  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370 (alteration in original) (quoting Richard A. Brealey et al., Principles of 
Corporate Finance 373 (2008)). 
78  
Id. (quoting Brealey et al., supra, at 13). 
79  
Id. 
80  
Id. 
81  
Id. at 367. 
82  
Id. 
83  
Id. at 373 n.144 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cornell, 
supra, at 47). 
84  
Id. at 349. 
85  
Dell, 177 A.3d at 7. 
86  
Id. at 25-27. 
87  
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See DFC, 172 A.3d at 372 ("Although the Court of Chancery has broad discretion to make 
findings of fact, those findings of fact have to be grounded in the record and reliable principles of 
corporate finance and economics."); id. ("[T]he Chancellor found that the deal price was 
unreliable because DFC was in a trough with future performance dependent upon the outcome of 
regulatory actions, but he cited no economic literature to suggest that markets themselves cannot 
price this sort of regulatory risk." (emphasis added)); see also Dell, 177 A.3d at 24 ("We consider 
each of these premises in turn and find them untenable in view of the Court of Chancery's own 
findings of fact as considered in light of established principles of corporate finance."); id. at 30-
31 (describing trial court's finding that the Dell sale process only involved private equity bidders 
and therefore had attributes of a common value auction, which in turn affected price, as "not 
grounded in accepted financial principles"). 
88  
See Dell, 177 A.3d at 22 ("[W]hatever route it chooses, the trial court must justify its 
methodology (or methodologies) according to the facts of the case and relevant, accepted 
financial principles."); see also id. at 5 (explaining that the trial court "erred because its reasons 
for giving [the stock price and the deal price] no weight—and for relying instead exclusively on 
its own discounted cash flow ('DCF') analysis to reach a fair value conclusion of $17.62—do not 
follow from the court's key factual finding and from relevant, accepted financial principles"); id. 
at 6 ("[T]he trial court's decision to rely 'exclusively' on its own DCF analysis is based on several 
assumptions that are not grounded in relevant, accepted financial principles."). 
89  
See DFC, 172 A.3d at 388 ("[T]he Court of Chancery must exercise its considerable discretion 
while also explaining, with reference to the economic facts before it and corporate finance 
principles, why it is according a certain weight to a certain indicator of value."); see also Dell, 
177 A.3d at 5-6 ("We defer to the trial court's fair value determination if it has a 'reasonable basis 
in the record and in accepted financial principles relevant to determining the value of 
corporations and their stock.'" (quoting DFC, 172 A.3d at 348-49)); DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 
(explaining that trial court erred when giving one-third weight to the deal price where "economic 
principles suggest that the best evidence of fair value was the deal price"). 
90  
See, e.g., DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 ("[E]stablished corporate finance theories suggest that the 
collective judgment of the many [in a market] is more likely to be accurate than any individual's 
guess."); id. at 366 & n.104 (collecting valuation treatises to support proposition that "in any 
assessment of the economic value of something—be it a company, a product, or a service—
economics teaches that the most reliable evidence of value is that produced by a competitive 
market"); id. at 366 n.104 ("Most of us economists who believe in this efficient market theory do 
so because we view markets as amazingly successful devices for reflecting new information 
rapidly and, for the most part, accurately." (quoting Burton G. Malkiel, Are Markets Efficient?, 
Wall St. J., Dec. 28, 2000); id. at 367 (noting that the fair value of the petitioners' shares "would, 
to an economist, likely be best reflected by the prices at which their shares were trading as of the 
merger"); id. at 370 ("[C]orporate finance theory reflects a belief that if an asset—such as the 
value of a company as reflected in the trading value of its stock—can be subject to close 
examination and bidding by many humans with an incentive to estimate its future cash flows 
value, the resulting collective judgment as to value is likely to be highly informative . . . ."). 
91  
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See Dell, 177 A.3d at 5 ("The problem with the trial court's opinion is not, as the Company 
argues, that it failed to take into account the stock price and deal price. The trial court did 
consider this market data. It simply decided to give it no weight. But the court nonetheless erred 
because its reasons for giving that data no weight . . . do not follow from the court's key factual 
findings and from relevant, accepted financial principles."); id. at 34 ("The actual facts 
concerning Dell's market values—the particularities of its stock market and the sale process—
demonstrate that the court of Chancery's reasons for assigning no weight to the market values are 
flawed."); id. at 35 (citing list of factors, including "the evidence of market efficiency," that 
results in the trial-level outcome in Dell "abus[ing] even the wide discretion afforded the Court 
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